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Abstract  
 
Health and wellbeing apps are proliferating at an exponential rate. It has created a billion dollar 
market that would make the industry seek every opportunity to take a competitive advantage. At 
times, this may be at the expense of the privacy of the app users. While most such apps do not 
collect sensitive medical data, some may collect or generate sensitive data during processing thus 
creating a high degree of risk towards users privacy. However, the current EU laws seem to be 
inadequate in protecting the privacy expectations of the users of such apps especially in the light 
of technologies such as cloud computing, big data and profiling. Meanwhile the EU and the Na-
tional regulators seem to be facing a dilemma of harmonizing economic and wider societal bene-
fits of personal and sensitive data processing and the data subject‘s right to privacy. This thesis 
postulates that privacy risk assessment is one strategy to harmonize these interests and ensure 
privacy of the health and wellbeing app users. Thus, it embarked first on enumerating the contri-
bution to privacy risks by the health and wellbeing apps before recognizing the current state of 
privacy risk assessments within the EU context. It then recognized means of harmonizing the EU 
laws, industry interests and the privacy expectation of the app users. Through its analysis, the 
thesis proposes a scalable and a transparent privacy risk assessment obligation on the app devel-
opers and data controllers as a solution. However, in order to implement such an obligation, the 
EU laws ought to provide appropriate methodologies to ease the legal uncertainties as recom-
mended through this thesis. At the same time, the National laws ought to provide standards for 
privacy risk assessments based on reasonable expectations of the app users, principles of propor-
tionality, reasonable terms and qualitative parameters of privacy rights, supplementing the EU 
laws. 
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1. Introduction  
1.1. Background and justification 
 
Mobile health or m-Health apps is the generic term used to identify apps dealing with health da-
ta
1
. Among m-Health apps, some deal with prevention, diagnosis and treatment of diseases and 
communicate with the health care professionals. Other m-Health apps collect and process data 
related to lifestyle, fitness and wellbeing of a person mainly for the persons own use
2
.  While the 
distinction may not be clear cut at all times, apps contributing to the care pathways
3
 are regulated 
to a certain extent through national and international laws (e.g. Council Directive 93/42/EEC on 
Medical Devices) and m-Health specific accreditation mechanisms (e.g. Accreditation programs 
for m-Health apps by National Health Services, United Kingdom and  Federal Drug Authority, 
USA). The second group of apps, referred hereafter as ‗health and wellbeing apps‘, are not so 
regulated given its seemingly non-impacting nature on care pathways. However, such apps are 
capable of collecting numerous health related and non-health related personal data from users as 
with any other mobile app.   
 
At present, there are more than 100,000 such apps available in the market and this number is 
expected to multiple many folds
4
. Health and wellbeing apps market in Europe will reach 5.4 
billion Euros by 2017, exceeding that of North America
5
. Given the ability of  health and wellbe-
ing apps to empower citizens, cut costs for healthcare systems, function as an effective channel 
of communicating health messages to a large section of the population, and contribute to im-
proved health outcomes among the population
6
, it is likely that such apps would dominate the 
                                                 
 
1 Kay, Misha, Jonathan, Santos and Marina, Takane. mHealth – New horizons for health through mobile tech-
nologies. Geneva, World Health Organisation, 2011. (Global-Observatory for eHealth series–3/2011). 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Vanhaecht K, De Witte K, Sermeus W. The impact of clinical pathways on the organisation of care proc-
esses. Belgium,(KU Leuven) 2007. 
4
 European Commission. Green paper on mobile health (“mHealth”).Brussels, (European Commission) 2014. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Supra, note 2 
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market in the coming years. At the same time, given the freedom enjoyed by health and wellbe-
ing apps from the regulators, businesses and individuals can come up with innovations that 
propagate the industry further. While the wealth of data collected through these apps provides 
researchers, governments, industry as well as the users many benefits, there may be instances 
where such benefits are gained at the expense of users‘ privacy7. 
 
From a practical point of view, the different types of data collected through health and wellbeing 
apps may include vital signs such as heart rate, blood pressure, body temperature, blood glucose 
levels and other lifestyle data such as food consumption and number of steps taken during the 
day. According to Article 7 of the European Union (EU) data protection directive
8
, these data are 
to be considered personal data if the same relates to an identified or identifiable natural person. 
In some instances, as in the case of medical data, EU directives consider the same as sensitive 
data necessitating special provisions for its processing
9
. However, there are issues pertaining to 
health and wellbeing apps, in terms of determining whether such apps are dealing with sensitive 
data or not. For instance, some data may not be considered as ‗sensitive data‘ when registered 
once or used as it is. However, when combined with other data sets and information, it may give 
rise to sensitive information regarding the health and lifestyle of a particular person
10
. The sensi-
tive data thus created may be used by a third party for targeted actions.  
 
At present, it is perceived that m-Health apps can be made to comply with the EU directives 
simply by obtaining the consent of the user or the data subject
11
. However, this would require 
data subjects being able to review the privacy policy and be informed about what data collected 
and for what purpose. Nevertheless, such privacy policies are not mandatory for health and well-
                                                 
 
7
 Lupton, Deborah. M-health and health promotion: The digital cyborg and surveillance society. In:Social Theory & 
Health.Vol.10 (2012), pp. 229-244. 
8
 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to 
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (hereinafter ‗DPD‘), 24 October 1995, 
Article 7. 
9
 DPD, Article 8. 
10
 Supra, note 4. 
11
 Mylonas, Alexios, Marianthi Theoharidou, and Dimitris Gritzalis. Assessing privacy risks in Android: A user-
centric approach.Geneva, Springer International Publishing, 2014. (Lecture notes in Computer Science Series; 
8418/2014)  
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being apps currently available in the market, at least from the point of view of sellers or distribu-
tors of these apps
12
. At the same time, even if such policies are made available, it is recognized 
that app users are generally oblivion to privacy policies and therefore may ignore the privacy 
statements or may not understand them at all
13
. Thus, there is a need for a responsible party to 
minimize the privacy risks enforced upon the users
14
. 
 
Recognizing this need, particularly in relation to health and wellbeing apps, the Article 29 Work-
ing Party accepted risk-based approach to privacy as a balanced means of recognizing the poten-
tial privacy risks
15
. It also recommended to develop guidelines for privacy impact assessment 
and other accountability tools in line with privacy risk management methodologies adopted by 
CNIL (Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés – French Data Protection Author-
ity) and ICO (Information Commissioner‘s Office, UK)16. The Article 29 Working Party opinion 
complements Article 33 of the proposed Data Protection Regulations (GDPR)
17
, which describes 
the contents of a data protection impact assessment to be carried out in relation to data process-
ing operations that pose a specific risk. In that, one area is to perform a risk assessment in-line 
with the rights and freedoms of the data subjects, including privacy rights
18
. At the same time, 
the GDPR also states that commission may specify standards and procedures for carrying out, 
verifying and auditing such assessments
19
. In other words, those who are developing health and 
wellbeing apps or those who are controlling or processing personal data would be liable for not 
adhering to acceptable data protection impact assessments, of which privacy risk assessment 
plays a central role. This also means that at least in the EU context, privacy risk assessment re-
                                                 
 
12
 Supra, note 11. 
13
 Felt, A, Ha, E, Egelman, S, Haney, A, Chin, E and Wagner, D. Android permissions: user attention, comprehen-
sion, and behavior. In: Proceedings of the 8th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security.ACM (2012). 
14
Article 29 Working Party. Opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices – WP202. http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp223_en.pdf  [visited 2
nd
 October 2015].  
15
Article 29 Working Party, Statement on the role of a risk-based approach in data protection legal frameworks - 
14/EN WP 218. http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2014/wp218_en.pdf [visited 28th September 2015] 
16
Supra, note 15 
17
 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regula-
tion) (hereinafter ‗GDPR‘), 25 Jan. 2012, COM(2012) 11 final—2012/0011(COD) 
18
GDPR, Section 3, Article 33 (3) 
19
GDPR, Section 3, Article 33 (7) 
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garding health and wellbeing apps has not yet been guided in accordance with the actual privacy 
expectations of its users. In the absence of a holistic guidance, uncertainty manifests in the minds 
of those who develop such apps, those who determine and control data processing operations and 
among the users. In such a situation, exploitation of data might take place and the industry will 
undertake innovations overenthusiastically. Furthermore, undue fears about privacy breaches 
among the users may prevent them from using such apps and thereby loosing the individual and 
societal benefits afforded to them by such apps.  
 
Thus, this thesis expects to fill this vacuum by discussing some of the key elements of a privacy 
risk assessment for health and wellbeing apps in view of harmonizing the EU laws, industry in-
terests and actual privacy expectations of the app users. 
 
1.2. Research questions  
 
Thus, this thesis undertakes answering several research questions. These include; 
1. How mobile health and wellbeing apps contribute to privacy risks? 
2. What is the state of privacy risk assessment approaches relevant to mobile apps process-
ing personal data? 
3. What are the important considerations in relation to privacy risks assessment approaches 
that would facilitate harmonisation the EU laws, industry interests and actual privacy ex-
pectations of the users of health and wellbeing apps   
1.3. Scope and limitation of the thesis  
 
Given the nature of privacy risk assessments and related processes such as privacy impact as-
sessment (PIA) and data protection impact assessment (DPIA), this research needs to be specific 
in areas that it shall focus and areas that it shall exclude. 
 
As a start, the thesis limits itself to privacy risks related to health and wellbeing apps. 
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At the same time, as indicated in the background and justification, this thesis also limits its scope 
to the privacy risk assessment, which is usually embedded within much wider privacy impact 
assessment (PIA) methodologies. There are several reasons for the thesis to limit its focus to pri-
vacy risk assessment. Firstly, a fully-fledged PIA for health and wellbeing apps is beyond its 
time and resource availability. Secondly, gaining the support of the industry for a privacy risk 
assessment process has been recognized as one of the biggest challenges within the PIA as indus-
tries are less motivated in undertaking a time consuming and costly privacy risk assessment than 
adhering to a less stringent requirements set out by the law
20
. Thus, most PIAs conducted by the 
industry are mere legitimizations than true risk assessments. Therefore, by focusing on the pri-
vacy risk assessment of the PIA, the thesis should be able to enumerate ways and means of miti-
gating this challenge. Thirdly, given the specialized nature of health and wellbeing apps, any 
recommendation related to privacy risk assessment should be concrete enough to uncover all 
potential risks and be generic enough to be applicable to all potential applications of such tech-
nologies
21
. This emphasizes that even the privacy risk assessment component within the PIA is 
substantial enough to warrant an in-depth analysis. 
 
From a different point of view, the thesis distances itself from the traditional information tech-
nology (IT) risk assessment methods (or IT security risk assessment), which are more focused on 
tangible assets and system security
22
. While acknowledging that privacy and security risks are 
interconnected, a security focused risk assessment is known to cause ineffective communication 
strategies, high level of uncertainty in risk estimation and incomprehensible risk estimation 
measures
23
. Furthermore, one of the main objectives of this thesis is to discuss important legal 
norms in privacy risk assessment thus leading to a comprehensive understanding of legal privacy 
                                                 
 
20
 Privacy impact assessment. Edited by Wright, David and Paul De, Hert.  Houten,(Springer Science & Business 
Media) 2011. 
21
 Supra, note 20. 
22
 Terje, Aven. A semi-quantitative approach to risk analysis, as an alternative to QRAs. In:Reliability Engineering 
& System Safety. Vol.93(2008), pp.790 – 797. 
23
 Paintsil, Ebenezer and Lothar, Fritsch. Towards Legal Privacy Risk Assessment Automation in Social Media. er-
schienen im Tagungsband der INFORMATIK 2011. http://www.user.tu-berlin.de/komm/CD/paper/090221.pdf 
[Visited 17th November 2015]. 
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risk assessment pertaining to health and wellbeing apps. This is another reason for the thesis to 
distance itself from the traditional IT risk assessment methods. 
 
Lastly, given the variation in technology, application and the context pertaining to health and 
wellbeing apps, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to enumerate a comprehensive list of privacy 
risks emanating from such apps or to define best practices for the industry in undertaking a pri-
vacy risk assessment. Instead, as indicated through the research questions, the thesis will focus 
on important considerations in relation to privacy risk assessment approaches that would allow 
harmonising the EU laws, industry interests and actual privacy expectations of the users.  
1.4. Legal method 
 
When considering the focus of this thesis, which is to harmonize the EU laws, industry interests 
and actual privacy expectations of the users of health and wellbeing apps, it is clear that the the-
sis needs to adhere with a non-doctrinal legal research methodology
24
.  
 
Thus, at the heart of this thesis will be the European Data Protection Directive
25
 (referred hereaf-
ter as the DPD) and the Directive on privacy and electronic communications
26
 (referred hereafter 
as the e-Privacy directive). However, given the state of flux existing within the EU context re-
garding data protection laws, the proposed EU General Data Protection Regulation (referred he-
reafter as GDPR) will also act as a primary source of data. In addition, court decisions (European 
Court of Justice, European Court of Human Rights and other court decisions pertaining to the 
European context), Article 29 Working party opinions and national legislation in European con-
texts shall also be utilized as sources of data. 
 
                                                 
 
24
 The Oxford handbook of empirical legal research. Edited by Cane, Peter and Herbert, Kritzer.Oxford, (University 
Press) 2010. 
25
 Directive 95/46/EC (DPD) 
26
 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing 
of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and 
electronic communications)(e-Privacy Directive) 
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From the point of view of privacy risk assessment, the thesis will make use of privacy risk man-
agement methodologies adopted by CNIL (Commission nationale de l'informatique et des li-
bertés – French Data Protection Authority), ICO (Information Commissioner‘s Office, UK) and 
the Privacy and Data Protection Impact Assessment Framework for RFID Applications. These 
will be referred hereafter as CNIL PIA, ICO PIA and RFID PIA respectively. At the same time, 
the thesis will also make use of other relevant privacy risk assessment literature that would pro-
vide an understanding of the current state of affairs in relation to risk-based approach to privacy 
in the EU context. The RFID PIA was chosen for this analysis on the basis that it was recognized 
as generic enough to be utilized as a blue print for privacy impact assessment in relation to the 
internet of things
27
. The ICO PIA and the CNIL PIA were selected on the basis that these were 
recognized by the Article 29 working party as suitable references for developing guidelines on 
impact assessment
28
. 
 
However, for the purpose of this thesis, which is limited by time and resources, the empirical 
data utilized in traditional non-doctrinal research would be gathered through secondary sources. 
This would mean that when it comes to enumerating the actual privacy expectations of health 
and wellbeing app users, this thesis will depend on secondary data sources such as journal ar-
ticles and texts books, which discuss privacy expectations from a user-based perspective. Simi-
larly, in order to understand the implications of the health and wellbeing app technology on pri-
vacy and to deduce the innovative potential of the app industry, the thesis will depend on sec-
ondary sources.  
 
During the legal analysis, the thesis will discuss both the applicability of the current laws, regula-
tions, guidelines and judicial decisions (de lege lata) and how it ought to be in the future (de lege 
ferenda) practice of privacy risk assessment pertaining to health and wellbeing apps.   
 
 
                                                 
 
27
 Privacy Impact Assessment, Supra, note 20.  
28
 Supra, note 15. 
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1.5. Organization of the thesis 
 
The thesis is organized into seven chapters including the introduction chapter. The second chap-
ter will present the core concepts related to this thesis and will provide the thesis with a firm 
grounding. The third chapter will present an overview of health and well being apps and various 
aspects related to the privacy discourse around the same.  
 
The fourth chapter will discuss the current legal discourse around risk-based approach to privacy 
and would link the same with privacy risk assessment in health and wellbeing apps.  
 
The fifth chapter will compare between three different privacy impact assessment approaches 
namely the RFID PIA, ICO PIA and the CNIL PIA. The aim of this chapter will be to enumerate 
the current state of privacy risk assessments in the EU.   
 
The sixth chapter will discuss the issue of harmonizing the different interests within privacy risk 
assessments.  
 
The seventh chapter will present the conclusions and will make recommendations related to 
harmonizing the EU laws, industry interests, and the privacy expectations of the health and well-
being app users.  
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2. Core concepts 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce some of the core concepts used within this thesis, 
which provide this thesis with the necessary grounding and a point of departure. Thus, it will 
bring to the forefront the concepts of personal data and its processing, sensitive data, data con-
troller and data processor and the different terms used in the privacy discourse.  
2.1. Personal data and processing 
 
According to the DPD
29
 Article 2(a), personal data refers to ―any information relating to an iden-
tified or identifiable natural person.‖ It further explains that within the ambits of personal data, 
its potential to identify a person may be either direct or indirect and may refer to an identification 
number or to one or more factors specific to his or her ―physical, physiological, mental, econom-
ic, cultural or social identity.‖ This means that even if it is not apparent at the time of collection, 
if a particular data, on its own or in combination with other data, refers to an identifiable person, 
such data can be considered as personal data.  
 
Within the DPD, processing personal data is elaborated in detail and this covers ―any operation 
or set of operations performed upon personal data‖, either manually or through automated 
means
30
. Thus, it is interesting to note that the collection of personal data itself is also part of 
data processing. From a DPD perspective, this would mean that collection of personal data of 
any nature requires obtaining the data subjects unambiguous consent or fulfilling other criteria 
such as the need to fulfill contractual obligations by the data controller, protecting the vital inter-
ests of the data subject, abide by legal obligations...etc.  
2.2. Sensitive data 
 
The necessity to consider certain types of personal data as ‗sensitive data‘ emerged as a result of 
such data being able to impart severe consequences on the individual‘s right to privacy and the 
                                                 
 
29
DPD 
30
See DPD, Article 2 (b). 
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right for non-discrimination
31
. Within the EU, it is recognized that data types such as health data 
and sexual orientation related data may have irreversible and long-term consequences when mi-
sused than when other types of personal data are misused
32
. Thus, special provisions for 
processing such data are provided through the Article 8 of the DPD under ‗special categories of 
sensitive data‘. In general, Article 8(1) imparts a general prohibition on the processing of person-
al data that reveals ―racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, 
trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life.‖ Thus, when it 
comes to sensitive data, the DPD not only considers data which by its very nature contains sensi-
tive information, but it also considers data through which sensitive information can be concluded 
through processing or otherwise. Nevertheless, Article 8(2) describes exceptions to section 1, out 
of which the most important would be instances where the data subject‘s explicit consent has 
given to the processing of such data.  
2.3. Data subject, data controller and data processor  
 
While the DPD is not explicit about the definition of the data subject, it is understood that the 
data subject means an individual who is the subject of the personal data being discussed within 
the said directive.  
 
On the other hand, the DPD is much clearer about the data controller and the data processor, the 
two entities responsible for adhering with the DPD. Article 2 of the DPD describes that a data 
controller is a ―natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which alone or 
jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data;…‖. 
Data processor on the other hand is defined as ―a natural or legal person, public authority, agency 
or any other body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller.‖33 
 
                                                 
 
31
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Handbook on European data protection law. Belgium. 2014. 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Handbook_data_protection_ENG.pdf [Visited 14th October 2015]. 
32
 Supra, note 31. 
33
 DPD, Article 2 (e). 
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Most data controllers within the ambit of the DPD are organizations although individuals may 
also be considered as data controllers. However, data processors may not directly be subjected to 
the current Directive.  
 
In addition to these two concepts, the GDPR introduces a new legal entity known as the ‗produc-
er‘. Producer refers to an entity creating automated data processing and filing systems for 
processing personal data by the data controllers and data processors
34
. From the point of view of 
the GDPR, producers and data processors together are responsible for technical and organiza-
tional measures that would allow data controllers by-default to adhere with its regulations
35
.  
2.4. Privacy and privacy risk 
 
Privacy is a term defined in Oxford dictionary as the ―state in which one is not observed 
or disturbed by other people.‖36 When it comes to the legal domain, privacy has been described 
as an amorphous concept that is difficult to define
37
. With respect to this thesis, privacy would 
refer to informational privacy as the key focus here is personal and sensitive data. 
 
The European perception on privacy is largely grounded on the statements set forth within the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In that, Article 7 states, ―Everyone has 
the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home, and communications.‖ Article 8 
on the other hand lays down the basic rights for personal data protection. However, it is under 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Lisbon Treaty)
 38
 that protection of per-
sonal data became a fundamental right from the perspective of the EU. As a result, within the EU 
context, upholding the core elements in the exercise of data protection and privacy became foun-
dation to most, if not all, legal and policy measures.  
 
                                                 
 
34
 See GDPR 
35
 See GDPR, Article 23 
36
 Available at http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/privacy 
37
 Bernstein ao v Bester NO AO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC); 1996 (4) BCLR 449 (CC) 
38
 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007 
  
12 
 
Within the EU, the Data Protection Directive (DPD)
39
 and the E-Privacy Directive
40
 provide the 
necessary legal provisions to uphold the values set forth by the above treaties in ensuring privacy 
and data protection. These legal provisions are formulated around the data protection principles 
set out by the Article 5 of the Convention 108, and it is these principles that drive the privacy 
discussion even at present. 
 
However, in accordance with the principle of lawful processing, privacy as set forth within the 
directives and within the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU, is not an absolute right
41
. 
The point here is that privacy should be considered in relation to its function in the society
42
 and 
this would mean that the EU understanding of privacy protection is necessarily a balance against 
the fundamental freedoms of free movement of persons, goods, services and capital.  
 
Privacy risk on the other hand is a state in which an individual‘s privacy is threatened as a result 
of his or her personal data being mishandled
43
. For the purpose of this thesis, it can also be 
viewed as the ―potential loss of control over personal information‖ even when a person has given 
his or her consent to the processing of such data
44
. 
2.5. Risk analysis and risk assessment 
 
In simple terms, risk analysis is the method used in estimating risks. Risk assessment on the oth-
er hand, is the method in which risks can be qualitatively and quantitatively estimated
45
.  
                                                 
 
39
 See DPD 
40
 E-Privacy Directive 
41
 See, CJEU, Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker and Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v. Land 
Hessen, 9 November 2010, para. 48. 
42
 Supra. 
43
 Martin, Hansen...(et al.). Shaping the Future of Electronic Identity Privacy Requirements. 
http://futureid.eu/data/deliverables/year1/Public/FutureID_D22.03_WP22_v1.0_PrivacyRequirements.pdf [Visited 
20th October 2015]. 
44
 Greenaway, Kathleen, Susan Zabolotniuk, and Avner Levin. Privacy as a Risk Management Challenge for Corpo-
rate Practice. 2012. Ted Rogers School of Management. 
http://ryerson.ca/content/dam/tedrogersschool/privacy/privacy_as_a_risk_management_challenge.pdf [Visited 11th 
November 2015]. 
45
 Privacy impact assessment, Supra, note 43 
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While most risk analysis methods depend on historical incidents, their known damages and the 
frequency of occurrence under different circumstances, such methods are bound to become inef-
fective when it comes to complex systems and when analyzing privacy risks
46
. The reason being 
that in privacy risk analysis, a particular event that may seem innocent in terms of its handling of 
data at present, may in fact cause personal distress to a person at a later stage. At that point, the 
previous handling of data may be interpreted as a mishandling. Such events are likely to manifest 
particularly when it comes to sensitive data such as health data. Thus, these situations demand 
for a risk assessment that would be sensitive to a wide range of factors that contribute to the ma-
nifestation of a privacy risk.  
2.6. Data Protection Impact Assessment 
 
DPIA can be described as a method of checking whether the legal requirements spelt out by var-
ious directives and regulations within the EU are met when undertaking a data processing task
47
. 
In general, DPIAs require following a checklist that would detail the various actions and meas-
ures to be taken in terms of different data protection principles as provided through different di-
rectives and regulations. At present, there isn‘t an obligation towards carrying out a DPIA within 
the EU other than the general obligation to comply with the data protection laws
48
. Thus, one 
may argue that DPIA is a compliance exercise than an attempt at assessing the true privacy risks 
to the data subjects.  
2.7. Privacy impact assessment 
 
Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) on the other hand is a concept that extends beyond being a 
compliance check as described in terms of a DPIA
49
. According to the European Commission, 
Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) is ―a process whereby a conscious and systematic effort is 
made to assess privacy risks to individuals in the collection, use and disclosure of their personal 
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data.‖50 Thus, PIA entails identifying privacy risks, foreseeing problems and determining solu-
tions that would be able to mitigate such problems. PIA can also be defined as a ―methodology 
for assessing the impacts on privacy of a project, policy, programme, service, product or other 
initiative and, in consultation with stakeholders, for taking remedial actions as necessary in order 
to avoid or minimise negative impacts.‖51 In most instances, the final aim of a PIA is to minim-
ize the risks. However, similar to the DPIA, PIA is still not a mandatory legal requirement.  
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3. Health and wellbeing apps and privacy 
 
The aim of this chapter is to understand how health and wellbeing apps create risks to the priva-
cy of its users. In doing so, the chapter will position the core concepts discussed in the previous 
chapter within the privacy discourse around health and wellbeing apps. Thereafter it will enume-
rate the industry interests, privacy expectations of the users, and the impact of cloud computing, 
big data and profiling technologies on app users‘ privacy.  
3.1. Overview 
 
Mobile apps are software programs designed to run in mobile devices such as smart phones and 
tablet computers. Such software are usually distributed through application distribution platforms 
owned by the owners of operating systems (OS) installed in various mobile devices as in the case 
of Apple App Store, Google Play for Android apps and Windows Phone Store. Although the 
distribution channels for mobile apps are largely limited, there are other application distribution 
channels owned by third parties as well. The apps made available in any distribution platform 
may be developed either by individuals or by organizations and may be available for a fee or for 
free.  
 
Health and wellbeing apps are also made available through application distribution platforms and 
it belongs to the broad category of mobile apps known as ‗mHealth‘ apps52. These apps may util-
ize a range of technologies such as short message service (SMS), 3G systems, global positioning 
systems (GPS), Bluetooth technologies and even external sensors in providing its services
53
. In 
most instances, these apps would directly or indirectly help or will claim to be helpful to its users 
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in maintaining or improving their healthy behaviour, quality of life and wellbeing in various 
ways
54
. 
3.2. Types of data collected 
 
While many other mobile apps would not evoke privacy and data protection concerns when used 
by the consumers, health and wellbeing apps attract attention from the regulators. The reason 
being that such apps collect personal data that may or may not be classified as health data as de-
scribed earlier. If such data is used for the persons own benefit and is not processed further, it is 
unlikely that it would evoke a threat to privacy. However, if the personal data collected through 
these apps are processed further, it may evoke the regulations set forth in the DPD and other 
laws. 
 
While most health and wellbeing apps may be recognizable as collecting personal data, it isn‘t 
easy to determine whether such apps are dealing with sensitive data or not. However, if a health 
and wellbeing app processes health data, it evokes Article 8 of the DPD that governs the 
processing of special categories of data as discussed earlier.  
 
However, although the DPD offers protection to health data, the problem there in is the difficulty 
in determining whether a particular type of data can be classified as health data or not. For in-
stance, non-medical data such as a person‘s weight, the number of steps taken, his or her blood 
pressure...etc may not be classified as health data. The reason being that these data on its own 
would not refer to a person‘s health status. However, it is not only the intrinsic nature of the data 
that makes them health data
55
. In other words, if personal data is processed in a medical context, 
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is monitored over a period of time and is capable of inferring reasonably to a person‘s health, 
such data may be considered health data within the ambits of the DPD
56
.  
 
This means that when health and wellbeing apps collect and store data related to one‘s eating 
habits, movements, weight, drinking or smoking habits, blood pressure, heart rate, daily exercis-
es...etc over a period of time, such data would become health data as these can be used to infer to 
a person‘s health status (e.g. disease risk and nutritional state)57. However, it is not possible to 
provide a blanket cover by saying all data collected by health and wellbeing apps are health data, 
as it would depend on the nature of the data collected, circumstances of its collection and the 
nature of its processing.  
3.3. App developer, data controller and data processor  
 
When it comes to health and wellbeing apps, there are different entities that can play the roles of 
data controller and data processor. For instance, in terms of data processing related to smart de-
vices and apps, app developers, manufacturers of operating systems and devices, app stores and 
other parties involved in processing personal data
58
 could all be playing the above two roles. 
 
Out of these entities, the app developer refers to an entity, which creates or deploys an app to be 
used by the consumers
59
. These developers can decide the purpose and the process in which con-
sumer‘s data would be processed, either within the device itself or through external processors. 
Therefore, the app developer may evoke the Article 2 (b) of the DPD in terms of being a ‗data 
controller‘ and thereby should align themselves with the directives requirements. At the same 
time, a developer may also evoke Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy directive if it accesses information 
that is stored within the consumer‘s device.  
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From the point of view of health and wellbeing apps however, other parties as mentioned earlier 
may not play an important role as a data controller when compared with the app developers. For 
instance, certain apps may utilize the GPS of the device to track the movements of a person and 
determine the geo-location of the person. In some instances, it may be possible that the OS and 
device manufacturers decide to use the personal data thus collected to improve its own location 
services. In such instances, the manufacturer would also become a data controller
60
. However, in 
terms of health and wellbeing apps, it is unlikely that OS and device manufacturers would handle 
health data, as was the case with the app developers.  
 
Similarly, app stores may also be playing the role of a data controller when it collects and 
process personal data of the clients who are downloading apps from its stores. While it may be 
true that personal data of consumers who download health and wellbeing apps may also be han-
dled in a similar manner by app stores, it is unlikely that these personal data be considered health 
data. 
 
Third parties on the other hand may act as both data controllers or as data processors. For in-
stance, if a data controller of a health and wellbeing app recruits a third party to process data or 
to provide analytics within its app, the third party is undertaking the role of a data processor. 
However, when a third party service utilizes the information gathered from a health and wellbe-
ing app for its own use (e.g. for targeted marketing), they would become data controllers
61
 as 
well. Nevertheless, this thesis sees the potential of app developers to track the path taken by a 
particular set of data in its processing cycle and therefore their ability to foresee the potential 
privacy risks towards the data subjects.  
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3.4. EU economic policies and industry interests 
 
Within the European context, mHealth has been recognized as a key area of innovation and re-
search
62
. The importance placed by EU policymakers on mHealth developments can be unders-
tood when considering that funding for mHealth projects began through Fifth Framework Pro-
gram in 1998 and have continued under the Horizon 2020 program
63
. One of the key objectives 
in promoting mHealth by the European community is its potential to make citizens co-managers 
of their own health and wellbeing.  
From an economic point of view, this would translate into cost savings for public health services 
and benefit the European economy as a whole. At the same time, a competitive mHealth market 
also means that Europe could attract investors, entrepreneurs, scientists and other professionals 
making EU a forerunner in mHealth developments and research
64
. Such leadership in the 
mHealth market has been seen as a wealth generator for any economy in the coming years
65
. 
Therefore, the EU has made it a priority to support web entrepreneurs through its eHealth Action 
Plan 2012-2020. In that, the goals are to network European high-technology accelerators to pro-
vide legal, financial and technical advice and training for eHealth start-ups
66
. The ultimate aim is 
therefore to create favourable market conditions for the entrepreneurs to develop innovative 
products and services including health and wellbeing apps. 
 
However, the EU policymakers have also recognized the usefulness of data gathered through 
mobile apps beyond its intended purpose for the benefit of the wider society. In fact, Article 29 
Working Party recognizes that such data are genuinely useful in other purposes and therefore the 
EU should facilitate some degree of additional use of such data with carefully balanced limits
67
. 
Specifically, the EU policymakers consider the vast amount of data gathered through mHealth 
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apps or ‗big data‘ as valuable to the EU and its population in many different ways68. Interestingly 
enough, the app industry also has the same understanding.  
 
From a practical point of view, mHealth industry also sees potential barriers in the form of lack 
of interoperability and open platforms
69
. While these issues are mostly recognized in relation to 
medical apps, this also indicates that the industry expects mHealth apps such as health and well-
being apps to communicate with one another and also with other services. In relation to open 
platforms, the industry sees the same as facilitating the innovative potential
70
 although the same 
would be much difficult to regulate and would be ‗unsafe‘ than closed proprietary platforms71.  
In other words, this thesis recognizes that an open approach to innovation without regulation 
may not promote consumers to take up health and wellbeing apps as they would with any other 
type of app. 
 
3.5. Actual user expectation  
 
From users point of view, they consider apps that support monitoring, tracking and reviewing 
behaviour, as in the case of certain health and wellbeing apps, useful and interesting
72
. At the 
same time, consumers are generally averse to sharing information related to health behaviour via 
social networks and react negatively towards constant intrusions by such apps through prompting 
and reminding
73
. In addition, the use and the perception regarding apps have also been recog-
nized as changing with the mood and the motivation of the user
74
.  
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In terms of perceived risks, users have conveyed their unease with regard to privacy of the data 
collected through health and wellbeing apps particularly when such apps use features of context 
sensing
75
. Adding to these concerns is users suspicion of these apps processing their data without 
their awareness or authorization
76
. However, it is unclear whether these fears have risen as a re-
sult of the users awareness regarding lack of laws and regulation on health and wellbeing apps or 
is it because of their inherent fears regarding data being kept on electronic devices or online. 
3.6. Technologies related to health and wellbeing apps 
 
Big data 
 
The concept big data refers to the ―capacity to analyze a variety of (unstructured) data sets from 
a wide range of sources‖77. Through such analysis, which are usually done through cost effective 
automated means, potentially valuable data can be extracted from unstructured raw data. The key 
to such extractions is the process of link building between different data sets and this would 
mean that in big data, relationships between data can be made apparent
78
.  
 
When considering health and wellbeing apps, the data collected may become part of the data sets 
linked and analyzed in big data processes. This could happen when these apps share data with a 
third party or else when the controllers of the collected data decide to do the processing by them-
selves. Through big data processes, it may be possible to harness valuable insights into health 
and wellbeing of a larger population, and also to make inferences regarding data subjects
79
.  
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While there are many potential benefits of big data processes, it may also lead to privacy inva-
sions as in the case of commercial exploitations
80
. Given that having more knowledge about the 
consumers would give commercial establishments an advantage in a competitive market such as 
in the EU, the tendency towards exploiting big data techniques around health and wellbeing apps 
would continue to pose a threat to privacy. 
Nevertheless, the DPD even in its present state provides some degree of safeguards for privacy 
concerns in an event such as big data. For instance, as per Article 6 of the DPD, data controllers 
are bound by the principles of legitimacy, data minimization, purpose limitation, transparency, 
data integrity and data accuracy. When applied to big data, any data controller would be bound to 
maintain data quality resulting from such processes. Further, the transparency principle is insepa-
rably connected within the legal grounds of consent, thereby requiring big data controllers to 
adhere with the same
81
.  
 
However, the market dynamics are such that data controllers, also being innovators, will con-
stantly recognize new opportunities and purposes that were not recognized earlier. To stay ahead 
of the market, they must grab opportunities presented to them and therefore may resist tracking 
or limiting such purposes
82
. Furthermore, re-informing the data subjects of the new purposes 
emerged as a result of big data may also not be feasible at all times given the automated nature of 
most such processes. It may be such factors that lead Article 29 Working Party to recognize the 
usefulness of allowing some degree of flexibility in additional use within carefully balanced lim-
its
83
.  
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Profiling 
User profiling refers to a process in which information about a user is collected to construct a 
particular profile
84
. Such profiles will consist of various attributes including geographical loca-
tion, academic and professionals‘ credentials, interests, memberships in professional groups, 
opinions and other attributes, which will aid in describing a person. The attributes recognized 
through profiling may be used for various purposes and among them, one of the primary uses is 
to recommend material and non-material things to a user that might have not yet thought about 
and may find it useful nevertheless
85
.  
 
In terms of health of a person, such profiling may aid predicting health risks based on the present 
lifestyle and other information extracted from the said person
86
. While profiling would inevitably 
be beneficial in terms of preventing harmful health outcomes and improving the quality of life of 
a person, the market driven economy might overtake the benefits of profiling through its exploi-
tations. For instance, an insurance company might refuse to insure a person on the basis that the 
person in question is linked with another person who is having a particular disease condition. 
Thus, profiling can impact on the privacy of the data subjects in an unprecedented level. 
 
In line with these views, the EU has recognized several areas of privacy concerns in relation to 
profiling that warrants its legislation to be amended accordingly
87
. For instance, it recognizes 
that by linking large number of individuals through profiling techniques, it would be possible to 
place individuals in a pre-determined category without their knowledge and therefore subjected 
to discrimination
88
. At the same time, such techniques make it possible to create new personal 
data other than the data communicated to the data controllers by the data subjects. While the EU 
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also sees the necessity to implement appropriate safeguards, it is of the view that such safeguards 
need to be balanced between privacy risks and benefits of profiling
89
. 
 
Although the DPD does not explicitly cover instances of profiling, Article 15 for instance recog-
nizes that individuals have a general right to object automated decision making. However, the 
DPD also justifies such automated processes in different circumstances as long as the individuals 
legitimate interests are recognized
90
.  
 
Article 29 working party however, after assessing the benefits and the negative consequences of 
profiling, determined that data controllers need to be clear with their data subjects regarding the 
―purposes for which the profiling is carried out and the logic involved in the automatic 
processing‖91. The working party also determined that when profiling does not significantly af-
fect the individuals rights, such profiling should not be subjected to specific rules and regulations 
except for the general data protection rules. However, it is unclear as to how to assess a ‗signifi-
cant affect‘ as indicated by the Working Party.  
 
Given the importance of profiling as a potential threat to data protection and privacy, the pro-
posed GDPR reserves its Article 20 for ‗measures based on profiling‘92. In fact, it is an extension 
of the Article 15 of the DPD and focuses on the data subjects legitimate interests, suitable safe-
guards and consent. At the same time, it focuses on having a balance between benefits of profil-
ing and privacy risks by emphasizing on the need to disclose the existence of an automated data 
processing method and the envisaged effects of such a process before the commission. However, 
Article 29 working party considers Article 20 of the GDPD as focusing merely on the outcomes 
of profiling than its process
93
. Thus, it proposes to broaden the scope of Article 20 in line with 
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providing greater transparency and control for the data subjects and more responsibility and ac-
countability of data controllers while maintaining a balanced approach to profiling
94
.  
Cloud computing 
 
By definition, cloud computing is ―a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand 
network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources that can be rapidly provi-
sioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction‖95. Thus, in 
cloud computing, the data might be subjected to a chain process involving multiple processors 
and sub-contractors. The processing in cloud computing may also take place in different geo-
graphical locations even within the European Economic Area (EEA), thus leading to a confusion 
regarding applicable data protection laws when disputes arise. More concerning is the transfer of 
personal and sensitive data outside the borders of the EEA to third countries where there isn‘t 
adequate data protection or safeguards for personal data. All these factors culminate in pointing 
out that cloud computing is an important consideration in any regime that expects to handle data 
protection and privacy concerns of the data subjects. 
 
From a legal point of view, the generalizability of the DPD provides for determining the respon-
sibility of different players including the data controllers and data processors in a cloud environ-
ment. However, as described earlier, when the data controller and the processor is not apparent, 
there can be issues in terms of accountability for data processing actions.  
 
As opined by the Article 29 Working party, a cloud client wishing to use cloud providers as a 
first step needs to undertake a thorough risk analysis
96
. For such analysis, the cloud providers are 
expected to provide all the information necessary to assess the pros and cons of adopting such a 
service. In relation to health and wellbeing apps, the cloud clients may often be the developers of 
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such apps as they may decide on adopting cloud services on behalf of the consumers. In other 
words, the responsibility emanating through the use of cloud services for health and wellbeing 
apps and its data may also be assigned to the apps developers.  Furthermore, the cloud clients 
have been recognized as responsible for guaranteeing the lawfulness of any cross-border data 
transfers particularly in relation to cloud computing. In terms of app developers, this would mean 
that they may have to undertake multiple legal responsibilities when such technologies are used 
for processing data.  
3.7. Contribution to privacy risk by health and wellbeing apps 
 
Through these discussions, it became clear that health and wellbeing apps may collect personal 
data. In most instances, such data may not give rise to a significant privacy threat on its own. 
However, as a result of big data techniques and automated processing, even the un-related, un-
structured, and raw data collected by health and wellbeing apps may generate new personal and 
sometimes sensitive data that may infer to a person‘s health status or lead to profiling of a per-
son. Given that the data subjects might have not consented to processing of new data emerging 
through big data and profiling, such actions may breach the privacy of the data subjects and may 
also be considered unlawful. 
 
While it is clear that health and wellbeing apps can lead to privacy issues, the laws that are in 
place to tackle such issues have become vulnerable. Understandably, it is the fast paced evolu-
tion of the technology that has made the laws weak. However, the struggle to balance between 
market requirements and rights of the data subjects seem to have caused delays in laws catching 
up with the technology as well. 
 
At present, the DPD provides a generalized approach to tackling the emerging privacy issues in 
instances such as health and wellbeing apps. These laws however are more or less dependent on 
identifying the data controllers and the data processors at a particular instance. In an era of cloud 
computing, the roles of data controller and the data processor may become unclear. Therefore, as 
far as the current DPD is concerned, accountability and responsibility for privacy and data pro-
tection may become difficult to achieve.  
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In relation to identifying who‘s responsible for processing data, it may be possible to argue that 
app developers most often than not may become the data controller. However, the OS, app stores 
and even the third parties could also act as data controllers in different instances. Nevertheless, 
the app developers are placed in such a way that they would have the capacity to determine the 
means of processing even when the data gathered through such apps are made available to third 
party data processors. Further, when it comes to cloud computing, the app developers would of-
ten act as the cloud client and thereby may also become the data controller on behalf of the data 
subjects. Therefore, these discussions indicate the important role played by app developers as 
data controllers, especially in the case of health and wellbeing apps.  
 
In terms of privacy risk assessment, this chapter highlights several important themes that need to 
be focused. One such theme is the appropriate linking between data protection principles and the 
privacy risk assessment. Second, is the role of consent in terms of privacy risks and third is the 
question of accountability. At the same time, it is interesting to assess the path taken by the EU 
in implementing privacy risk assessment given their dilemma to balance between different inter-
ests. These themes will form part of the discussion in chapter five.  
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4. Risk based approach to privacy  
 
This chapter will look into the legal discourse around risk-based approach to privacy. Thus, the 
chapter will start by presenting an overview of the risk-based approach followed by a discussion 
on the current and proposed EU laws supporting such an approach. Based on the discussions, this 
chapter will synthesize the implications of a risk-based approach on privacy risk assessments 
around health and wellbeing apps.  
4.1. Overview of risk-based approach to privacy 
 
From a data protection and privacy perspective, risk-based approach entails assessing the risks 
pertaining to data processing operations, which would determine the obligations of the data con-
trollers and the processors
97
. This means that in terms of data privacy, as discussed in chapter 2, 
a risk-based approach should focus on the threat towards privacy and the harm that may be 
caused as a result. However, the goal of a risk-based approach is to control relevant risks
98
 and 
therefore such approaches should weigh-in the benefits of managing privacy risks before imple-
menting controls to minimize such risks.  
 
Threats to privacy 
 
When it comes to personal data, threats to privacy can manifest at any stage of the information 
cycle including at the time of collection and disclosure. However, it is a variable entity as the 
characteristics of the data and the way in which the data is being handled (e.g. degree of ano-
nymisation) would vary from one instance to another. As a result, threats need to be assessed in a 
contextual manner taking into account the likelihood of the threat and the severity of its harm
99
.  
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Within the information lifecycle, there can be different categories of threats. These include un-
justifiable or excessive collection of data, use or storage of inaccurate or outdated data, inappro-
priate use of data, lost or stolen data and unjustifiable or unauthorised access, transfer, sharing or 
publishing of data
100
. When looking at these threats, it can be deduced that these have been rec-
ognized in line with the data protection principles such as legitimate purpose, purpose specifica-
tion and limitation, data relevancy, data accuracy and limited retention of data, fair processing 
and accountability. In other words, this alignment complies with the view that risk-based ap-
proach should supplement the existing data protection principles and laws.  
 
Harm 
 
Recognizing harm is a complex process. Not only it can be classified as direct and indirect 
harms, harm could also manifest in variety of ways including monetary, social, mental and phys-
ical harm
101
. Some describe harm in terms of tangible and intangible damage
102
. Tangible dam-
age could be physical or economic while intangible damage may include distress caused, reputa-
tional harm, apprehension or anxiety, intrusions into private life, discrimination and stigmatisa-
tion. While tangible damage may be assessed objectively, intangible damage such as that caused 
through privacy breaches in health and wellbeing apps may be difficult to assess objectively.  
 
On the other hand, harm may be classified differently as in the case of information based harm 
such as information inequality, information injustice and restriction of moral autonomy
103
. At 
times though, harm may not only be confined to an individual as certain types of harm such as 
loss of confidence and trust on data processing could have societal implications
104
.  
 
                                                 
 
100
 Supra, note 97 
101
 Neil Robinson, Hans Graux, Maarten Botterman and Lorenzo Valeri. Review of the European Data Protection 
Directive. 2009. https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/1042347/review-of-eu-dp-directive-summary.pdf 
[Visited 14th November 2015]. 
102
 Supra, note 97 
103
 Information Technology and Moral Philosophy. Edited by Weckert, J and Hoven, Jvd.London,(Cambridge Uni-
versity Press) 2008, p. 311. 
104
 Ibid. 
  
30 
 
Factoring in the benefits  
 
As described in earlier chapters, privacy is not an absolute right but a right that should be 
weighed in comparison to other fundamental rights. This means that a risk-based approach 
should focus on balancing between the benefits and the harms rather than trying to determine 
only the threats and the harms
105
.  
 
However, it is also understood that risks may not be remedied completely. In other words, if 
benefits sufficiently outweigh the risks, the said actions may be justified. The issue here is to 
determine and quantify the benefits as it was the case with assessing the harm emanating from 
various threats. 
 
From an individual perspective, benefits afforded through personal data processing may make a 
person relinquish personal information with the understanding that the said information would be 
used within a particular context
106
. The government on the other hand may decide on relinquish-
ing certain privacy rights of individuals, as in the case of law enforcement, on the basis that such 
information may be usable to the greater good of the society.  
 
These examples highlight the fact that assessment of benefits is also extremely contextual and 
that individual perceptions regarding their perceived benefits and harms may also play a key role 
in balancing between the two. Moreover, in a risk assessment process, the need to minimize the 
subjectivity is also highlighted, both in relation to assessing harm and the benefits afforded 
through data processing. 
4.2. Current and proposed EU laws supporting a risk-based approach to privacy 
 
Within the DPD, the risk-based approach has been endorsed to a certain extent. For instance, 
under Article 17, implementation of appropriate technical and organizational measures to safe-
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guard personal data has been made proportionate to the risks represented by the nature of the 
data to be protected. Similarly, under Article 20, the DPD emphasizes on the need to assess the 
risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects before data processing operations. Furthermore, 
the Article 29 working party views Article 8 of the DPD as a means of endorsing a risk-based 
approach as it considers special categories of data separately based on the increased risk im-
parted by such data to the data subjects privacy. While these measures may not explicitly state or 
support an implementations of a risk-based approach to privacy, to an extent, the value of such 
an approach was seen by the EU. 
 
Nevertheless, the importance of a risk-based approach was emphasized through the proposed 
GDPR through specific provisions. For instance, Article 22 of the GDPR adopts a risk-based 
approach to ensure accountability of the data controllers and Article 30 does the same for  ensur-
ing security of processing. In the latter case, the GDPR illustrates its willingness to balance be-
tween risks, ensuring security, degree of harm, state of the art and the cost of implementation. In 
other words, this may also be considered as an instance where the GDPR was trying to use risk-
based approach to balance between individual rights (security in this instance), harm, best prac-
tices (state of art) and industry interests (the cost).  
 
However, the most notable of the provisions within the GDPR in terms of risk-based approach is 
arguably the Article 33, which prescribes the use of an impact assessment. Article 33 lays down 
several instances of data processing operations with specific risks, which will necessitate under-
taking of an impact assessment. One component of the impact assessment according to Article 
33.3 is an undertaking of a risk assessment as envisaged through this thesis. 
 
Furthermore, the proposal to enforce protection by design as stated in Article 23 of the GDPR 
could also be viewed as a means of enabling a risk-based approach, which also leads way to-
wards implementing privacy-by-design.  
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4.3. Implications of a risk-based approach 
 
When looking at the evolution of the GDPR from its introduction in 2011, it is clear that the 
members of the EU and other stakeholders including the industry were critical of the burdening 
of data controllers and the producers. However, this was not because the industry was against a 
risk-based approach but because the GDPR may warrant the application of a disproportionate 
risk-based approach including an impact assessment across all instances of data processing as 
against a scalable approach
107
. 
 
However, Article 29 working party is of the view that data subjects should be afforded the same 
degree of protection in accordance with the data protections principles and regulations no matter 
the degree of risk, nature of the data and the scope of processing
108
. Nevertheless, this does not 
mean the risk-based approach should make data controllers undertake full-scale risk assessment 
or impact assessments. In the opinion of the working party, the obligation of the data controllers 
may vary according to the degree of risk, harm, nature of processing, type of data processed and 
other considerations
109
. It is in this sense that a risk-based approach would be useful as it will 
allow clarity in terms of the obligations of the data controller and a more objective assessment of 
the risks, harms and benefits associated with data processing. 
 
Through this discussion, this thesis also enumerates several themes that need to be considered 
when it comes to a privacy risk assessment. One such theme is the ‗determination of likelihood, 
threat and level of privacy risks‘ by factoring in the benefits of any kind of data processing oper-
ation. Secondly, the ‗scalability‘ of a privacy risk assessment. Thirdly, the concepts of ‗privacy-
by-design and privacy-by-default‘. These themes will be part of the discussion in the next chap-
ter. 
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5. State of privacy risk assessment approaches  
 
As justified in the legal method, this thesis focused its attention on three PIA approaches, 
namely; RFID PIA, ICO PIA and the CNIL PIA
110
 in order to assess the current state of privacy 
risk assessments within the EU. While a detailed elaboration of each privacy risk assessment 
component is beyond the scope of this thesis, several important themes that were enumerated in 
chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis were used in structuring the rest of the discussion herein. 
5.1. Important themes related to current privacy risk assessment approaches 
5.1.1. Link between data protection principles and privacy risk assessment 
 
The three PIAs considered for this research have selected either the DPD (e.g. RFID PIA) or the 
national data protection legislation (e.g. ICO PIA and CNIL PIA) as the starting point for its pri-
vacy risk assessment. Furthermore, in the case of RFID PIA, regulators to an extent have dis-
tanced themselves from differentiating between data protection and privacy principles
111
, leaning 
more towards the industry requirements than privacy concerns of the data subjects. However, in 
terms of health and wellbeing apps, such partiality may set a dangerous precedence given the 
potential of these apps to generate new personal and sometimes sensitive data through big data 
and profiling techniques.  
 
At the same time, the privacy risks emanating through processing personal data may not only be 
limited to information privacy but may also extend into various other privacy types. For instance, 
if the app intends to make use of biometric features in the mobile device, it may be invading into 
the privacy of the person as described by the ICO
112
. Similarly, an app that makes use of location 
tracking services of the mobile phone may be considered as invading the persons private space 
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through constant monitoring and could well be considered as invading the privacy of personal 
behaviour
113
. Thus, the scope of the concept privacy around personal and sensitive data seems to 
be expanding with the introduction of new technologies. Therefore, limiting the basis of privacy 
risk assessments to the fundamental principles of data protection, or even to information privacy 
per se, may not prove sufficient.  
 
Thus, as also suggested through literature
114
, focusing only on the data protection principles in 
the form of privacy targets (e.g. RFID PIA), privacy principles (e.g. ICO PIA) or legal controls 
(e.g. CNIL PIA) during privacy risk assessments may not capture the real privacy risks faced by 
the users of health and wellbeing apps. From the point of view of the data controllers and the 
regulators however, concentrating solely on the data protection principles in assessing privacy 
risks may not only be feasible but may also be cost saving. This would also mean that there is a 
certain imbalance in catering to the interests of the data subjects and the interests of the industry 
by the regulators. However, as opined by CJEU
115
, the balance between different interests influ-
enced by the DPD should take place at National level pertaining to individual cases. This em-
phasize on the obligation from the part of the national regulators to implement desirable privacy 
risk assessments that could balance between different interests.  
5.1.2. Consent and privacy risks 
 
Within the three PIAs assessed, consent seems to be a key focus. For instance, in the RFID PIA, 
consent features in the privacy target ―legitimacy of processing personal data‖. Consent also fea-
tures in relation to privacy risks such as ―invalidation of explicit consent‖ and ―illegitimate data 
processing‖ as described in the RFID PIA. Within the ICO PIA, consent features in relation to 
linking PIA with the data protection principles. It does so by prescribing to ask questions such as 
―If you are relying on consent to process personal data, how will this be collected and what will 
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you do if it is withheld or withdrawn?‖ The CNIL PIA on the other hand has introduced consent 
as one of the legal controls. Thus, as expected, it is clear that absence of the data subjects consent 
has been seen as a threat in almost all privacy risk assessments. 
 
However, the DPD in its present form, does not always bind the data controllers to obtain con-
sent from the data subjects. The reason for this is that consent is only one of several pre-
requisites for processing personal data as stated in the Article 7 of the DPD. Given that the other 
pre-requisites are broadly defined, in practice, data controllers could afford themselves to process 
personal data without having to obtain consent from the data subjects
116
. Even when the data 
controller obtains consent once, it does not mean the privacy risks to the data subject would be 
mitigated as a result. This may be particularly true when it comes to health and wellbeing apps 
where personal and sensitive data may be processed and sometimes created during the 
processing.  
 
At the same time, the ICO brings to the forefront an important aspect associated with consent, 
which is the risks pertaining to vulnerable individuals. In fact, the GDPR highlights the need to 
consider children as a special category of the population when obtaining consent for data 
processing
117
. 
 
In terms of health and wellbeing apps, another area of concern is its potential use of various de-
vice dependent features such as biometrics, geo-location data and various other sensors
118
. Thus, 
in order to comply with the DPD, the data controllers need to obtain consent from a user each 
time the app accesses these device features for a different purpose other than for the purpose to 
which the consent was given
119
. For instance, a health and wellbeing app may use geo-location 
services to provide the user with information regarding lifestyle activities around his or her loca-
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tion. This would be a form of behaviour advertising and data controllers would have to obtain 
consent each time it accesses the geo-location service. In this instance, the DPD may not be 
evoked as the collected data may not be personal in nature. However, as the app may be provid-
ing access to a third party at different locations, it has to comply with the Article 5(3) of the e-
Privacy Directive as mentioned earlier in the thesis.  
 
Thus, privacy risk assessment pertaining to health and wellbeing apps have to align itself with 
both the DPD and the e-Privacy Directive when determining the instances where data controllers 
need to obtain consent. At the same time, privacy risk assessments cannot consider its user base 
as homogeneous and assess risks pertaining only to one user group. This means that the users 
right to consent or not should be respected at a much granular level at least when processing per-
sonal and sensitive data within the privacy risk assessments
120
. From the point of view of the 
data controllers, the thesis recognizes such granularity as a chance to minimize instances requir-
ing consent of the users and therefore to avoid cumbersome obligations for notification as in the 
case of ICO. From the point of view of the users, such granularity would afford them more con-
trol over their personal data although with the downside of being flooded with notifications and 
requests for consent. For the regulators however, consent may be one legal obligation that could 
be better utilized in ensuring the privacy rights of the users. 
5.1.3. Accountability for the privacy risk assessment 
 
As discussed in chapter 3, accountability in terms of personal data processing is a concern for the 
data subjects and the regulators alike. In light of this unclearness, there is also an unclearness 
regarding who should take the responsibility and be accountable towards a privacy risk assess-
ment. As per the definition of a data controller
121
, the RFID PIA designates the responsibility of 
performing the RFID PIA on the RFID application operator who is described as a natural or a 
legal person who develops, implements, uses or maintains a RFID application
122
. Within the ICO 
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PIA, carrying out the privacy risk assessment is the responsibility of the organization which 
plays the role of the data controller. While data controller is also one of the recognized entities 
responsible for carrying out the privacy risk assessment within the CNIL PIA, it also elaborate 
on another entity known as the ‗product producer‘, whom would also be responsible for carrying 
out the assessment in some instances.  
 
In terms of health and wellbeing apps, one could argue that the privacy risk assessment should be 
carried out by the data controller as per the opinion of the Article 29 working party
123
. However, 
as described in chapter 3, recognizing the data controller pertaining health and wellbeing apps 
may not be an easy task especially in the event of mobile apps utilizing cloud computing and big 
data technologies. Further, the proposed GDPR introduces the term ‗producer‘ to whom the 
GDPR assigns partly the task of implementing measures that would allow data controllers to 
meet regulatory requirements
124
. This would mean that according to the GDPR, the producer is 
not accountable for personal data processing. 
 
However, this thesis is of the view that the ‗producer‘ as introduced by the GDPR, performs the 
same role as the app developer as discussed earlier. Given the superior contextual and architec-
tural understanding of the app developers regarding the information processes, this thesis be-
lieves app developers or producers to be in the best position to undertake a privacy risk assess-
ment. However, as often the case may be, app developers or producers would work to the blue 
print determined by an organization that desires obtaining information from the data subjects. 
Thus, the data controller within the ambits of the DPD in this case may not be the app developer.  
 
Given this uncertainty, the thesis perceives the need to implement a methodology towards recog-
nizing not only the data controller and the data processors, but also the entity responsible for 
performing the privacy risk assessment. From the point of view of the regulators, having such a 
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methodology would ease its regulatory activities. From the point of view of the data controllers, 
app developers and data processors, recognizing their roles would ease their legal uncertainty 
and will be better motivated in undertaking a privacy risk assessment.   
5.1.4. Scalability 
 
In chapter 4, it was enumerated that a risk-based approach to privacy should ideally be scalable 
in terms of the size of the organization, amount of data processed and other determinants. How-
ever, it was also enumerated that despite the scalability of a risk-based approach, the legal obli-
gations arising from processing personal data as per the data protection principles should remain 
the same for all.   
 
The RFID PIA in its initial analysis phase provides the privacy risk assessor with the option of 
determining an applicable PIA, based on processing of personal data. It also considers that not all 
RFID operators would have to be accountable for all the privacy targets defined. This means that 
the privacy risk assessment process in RFID PIA, could afford to adjust itself based on the priva-
cy targets it perceives as needing to achieve. However, although the accountability in terms of 
privacy obligations may be scalable, RFID PIA emphasizes that accountability in terms of data 
protection obligations should be the same for any organization despite the nature of the data they 
process
125
. Nevertheless, critiques argue that RFID PIA is not necessarily scalable but instead it 
is only offering two options of PIAs, which may not necessarily reflect the true nature or the 
complexity of a given project and its impact on privacy
126
. 
 
ICO and the CNIL on the other hand provide more scalability through different mechanisms. For 
instance, the ICO PIA offers the flexibility of determining the nature of the PIA adopted based 
on the project size, project goals, vision, actual privacy risks and based on the available re-
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sources. The CNIL on the other hand affords the businesses the option to scale its PIA based on 
multiple factors including legal and risk-treatment controls. However, the data protection obliga-
tions, which CNIL defines as ‗primary assets‘, are non-negotiable and must be complied. Within 
the GDRP however, there are suggestions to apply less strict data protection regime if apps un-
dertake pseudoanonymisation of personal data
127
. This thesis perceives this as an attempt at scal-
ing the legal obligations of the data controllers. 
 
From the data controllers‘ point of view, scalability of privacy risk assessments and their obliga-
tion to data protection and privacy principles would be highly desirable due to cost and liability 
reduction. Regulators may also be keen on scaling privacy risk assessments and the relevant le-
gal obligations on the basis that it will promote industry innovation and make markets more at-
tractive for businesses. From the point of view of the users however, scaling of the data control-
lers obligations towards data protection and privacy principles may be detrimental. Thus, this 
thesis perceives that if scalability of privacy risk assessments are guided inappropriately by the 
EU regulations, this research sees the potential of such assessments not living up to its expecta-
tions.  
 
5.1.5. Determining likelihood, threat and level of privacy risks 
 
In relation to the RFID PIA, some degree of guidance has been provided with regard to recogniz-
ing the privacy risks that may threaten the achievement of privacy targets as defined. In the as-
sessment however, although the RFID PIA states that likelihood of occurrence should be stated 
in accordance with the ‗principle of proportionality‘ and in ‗reasonable terms‘, it does not elabo-
rate on achieving proportionality or what it intends by ‗in reasonable terms‘. CNIL also asserts 
that PIA is a way of prioritizing the risks and treat them in a proportionate manner. The ICO on 
other hand refers to proportionality at different points. For instance, with regard to PIA, ICO 
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states that such assessments need not be complex or time consuming but should be performed 
with adequate level of rigor proportionate to the privacy risks arising.  
In terms of implementing the core PIA principles, the ICO views that it should be proportionate 
to the nature of the organization processing the data. This means that ICO has given organiza-
tions conducting PIAs the necessary flexibility in using their own expertise, methodologies and 
industry best practices in assessing risks, its likelihood, threats and degree of harm. In line with 
this view, this thesis also sees proportionality as an integral part of privacy risk assessments.  
 
When considering the meaning of ‗in reasonable terms‘ as stated within the RFID PIA, it may 
refer to the nature of the personal data being processed, the purpose of its processing, the indus-
try standards and the professional practices relevant to a privacy-by-design approach
128
. For ex-
ample, if a data controller for a health and wellbeing app decides to adopt an RFID PIA such as 
the one developed by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
129
, the decision 
should partly fulfil the requirement for ‗in reasonable terms‘. In this regard, it is also interesting 
to note the ECtHR ruling on MS vs Sweden
130
, where the Court asserted that even when sensi-
tive data related to a person is transferred without consent to a third party for processing (another 
public institution in this case), it does not violate the person‘s right to private life. The justifica-
tion for this ruling was that the said action was not disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued 
and was undertaken with adequate safeguards.  
 
Thus, it is the view of this thesis that the principle of proportionality justified by means of rea-
sonable terms could help data controllers determine the level of risks, its likelihood, threats and 
harms in an objective manner. 
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5.1.6. Implementation of privacy risk assessments 
 
In relation to implementing privacy risk assessments as a legal obligation, there seems to be little 
backing until GDPR proposed its implementation. Among the three PIAs analyzed, both ICO 
and CNIL PIAs are used as legal instruments in assessing the privacy compliance of data con-
trollers. However, none of the PIAs make it mandatory for submitting PIA reports to the regula-
tors although recording of the privacy risk assessment, the decisions taken and various outputs of 
different risk assessment stages have been recognized as essential when data controllers have to 
demonstrate their compliance to Courts or to national regulators. At the same time, while almost 
all PIAs encourage the publication of PIA reports, none has made it mandatory given the sensi-
tive nature of certain aspects of a PIA and the potential burden on the industry.  
 
However, when it comes to health and wellbeing apps, which sometimes process sensitive health 
data, there may be an argument to publish the PIA reports including the privacy risk assessment 
process or submit these documents to a regulatory authority.  
 
So far, the arguments against an obligation to publish the PIA report or privacy risk assessment 
emanated from the fact that industry sees such a mandatory provision as burdensome, costly, 
introduce bureaucratic processes, and time consuming
131
. Further, others may argue that manda-
tory reporting would become a mere compliance process than a true effort towards mitigating the 
privacy risks
132
. Nevertheless, it is argued that a PIA, which elaborates the privacy risk assess-
ment, may provide greater transparency towards handling of personal and sensitive data. This 
may improve trust and avoid fears of privacy breaches among the general public.  
 
Thus, the thesis perceives the need to impose some degree of legal obligation on the data control-
lers of health and wellbeing apps in performing and reporting the PIA including privacy risk as-
sessment, at least when such projects handle sensitive personal data. Given the overall under-
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standing that privacy risk assessments should be scalable to fit different projects and potential 
privacy breaches, the thesis also perceives the possibility of scaling reporting requirement as 
well.  
5.1.7. Concept of privacy-by-design and privacy-by-default 
 
Privacy-by-design and privacy-by-default are two concepts that have come into the limelight 
particularly after its inclusion in the proposed GDPR. According to the RFID PIA, PIA is useful 
in evaluating the success of privacy-by-design efforts at an early stage of development and prod-
uct specification. The ICO views PIAs as an integral part of a privacy-by-design approache while 
the CNIL views PIAs as a way of enabling data controllers to demonstrate that their product do 
not breach privacy. 
 
In implementing privacy-by-design and privacy-by-default, there are several principles that need 
to be adhered to
133
. These principles focus on proactively recognizing threats to privacy and re-
medying the same not only at the time of collection but also throughout the data life cycle in all 
aspects of a project. Thus, in order to realize privacy-by-design and privacy-by-default, it is vital 
that a privacy risk assessment is carried out at the very beginning of the project. 
 
When it comes to processing personal data, privacy-by-design concept also shows potential in 
easing the reporting burden for the industry and information intensiveness for the users
134
. With 
regard to health and wellbeing apps for instance, the data controller may have to face a reporting 
burden when working with personal data as they have to obtain informed consent from the users 
at regular intervals. Such information flooding would also be unattractive from a marketing point 
of view and may add a considerable transaction costs to the users. However, by adopting priva-
cy-by-design and privacy-by-default, organizations can minimize the amount of personal data 
that it has to deal with and therefore minimize the reporting burden and information flooding
135
. 
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Therefore, this thesis perceives privacy-by-design and privacy-by-default as a means of enhanc-
ing business processes along with user experiences while dealing with the privacy risks. 
5.2. Synthesis of the current state of privacy risk assessment approaches pertaining to 
mobile apps 
 
Through this discussion, it was made apparent that current privacy risk assessment approaches 
are largely compliance driven and are based on the data protection principles laid down within 
the DPD. These assessments consider consent to be a central component in the privacy risk as-
sessment process although the granularity in its application and sensitivity towards special 
groups of people remain lacking. Further, lack of accountability is seen as a key factor that can 
jeopardize the undertaking of privacy risk assessment responsibilities. 
 
It was also clear that current privacy risk assessments incorporate principles of scalability to dif-
ferent degrees. However, the attempt at scaling the data protection and privacy obligations of the 
data controllers is seen by this thesis as a concern from the part of the data subjects. At the same 
time, the privacy risk assessment approaches seem to distance itself from the proportionality 
principle and legitimate expectations of the users in assessing privacy risks.  
 
In terms of carrying out privacy risk assessments, the thesis recognizes a need to motivate the 
data controllers by implementing legal obligations on reporting such findings. Last but not least, 
current privacy risk assessment approaches were recognized to be supportive of privacy-by-
design and privacy-by-default concepts. However, this thesis understands that the EU legislation 
still lacks means of motivating data controllers to implement such processes, which would also 
require clear guidance from the part of the regulators.  
 
Out of the themes discussed in this chapter, it is noticeable that in certain instances data subjects‘ 
privacy interests were not upheld sufficiently. Confining privacy risk assessments to mere adhe-
rence of data protection principles and the coarse nature of assessing consent requirement are 
two of these instances. In some instances, as in the case of imparting non-scalable and non-
proportionate privacy risk assessments on the data controllers, there is a possibility that it may 
dampen the market and innovation related interests of the industry. Furthermore, lack of respon-
sibility and accountability from the part of the data controllers towards privacy risk assessment 
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may also be an instance where the interests of the regulators put to test. These three aspects 
would be the subject of discussion in the next chapter.  
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6. Harmonizing interests around health and wellbeing apps  
 
In the previous chapter, several areas were enumerated in which interests of the data subjects 
were disproportionately treated against the interests of the data controllers and the regulators. It 
is the view of this thesis that unless these interests can be balanced or harmonized, the harm re-
lated to privacy may outweigh the benefits of health and wellbeing apps. Therefore, this chapter 
will discuss each of these recognized areas in view of harmonizing the different interests under 
the themes, privacy beyond compliance, proportionality instead of stringency and accountability 
without borders.  
6.1. Privacy beyond compliance  
 
This thesis already recognized that privacy risk assessment ought to be more than a mere com-
pliance check. In terms of PIAs, it was enumerated that the concept of privacy expands with new 
technologies such as profiling and therefore limiting the concept to the fundamental principles of 
data protection and information privacy may not uphold the true privacy rights of the users of 
health and wellbeing apps. 
 
In order to see beyond a compliance check, it is argued that privacy risk assessments need to 
consider more qualitative requirements such as legality, legitimacy, participation and proportio-
nality
136
. While these requirements are addressed within the DPD to a certain extent, such at-
tempts are recognized as inadequate in the context of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) and the relevant case laws of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
137
.  
 
When it comes to privacy, Article 8 of the ECHR states that ―everyone has the right to respect 
for his private and family life...‖ and that ―there shall be no interference by a public authority 
with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society‖. The value placed on these statements can be illustrated in the case of Z. v. 
                                                 
 
136
 Privacy impact assessment, Supra, note 20 
137
 Supra, note 20 
  
46 
 
Finland, where the ECHR opined that the ruling of the National Court and the Court of Appeal to 
release Z‘s medical records containing Z‘s HIV status even after 10 years violates Article 8 of 
the ECtHR
138
. The basis of this judgement was that such an interference was not warranted in a 
democratic society and that protection of medical data is fundamental to the person‘s right to 
respect for private and family life. However, one may argue that as only States can be sued in 
ECtHR, it may not be useful to consider its case laws in determining privacy risk assessments to 
which contributory parties would most likely be private entities. Although this may be partly 
true, cases such as Oluic v. Croatia
139
 illustrate that even when private parties are involved, the 
State can be held liable, as it is the State, which should implement adequate privacy protection 
measures on behalf of its citizens in the context of ECHR.  
 
When focusing on the qualitative requirement of ‗legality‘, the ECtHR stated that monitoring by 
public authorities must be both in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic socie-
ty
140
. Thus, in the context of ECHR, the laws under which the monitoring is carried out should be 
explicitly stated within the law and be sufficiently clear to the individual concerned. From the 
point of view of health and wellbeing apps, this would mean that various data processing tech-
nologies such as profiling, cloud computing, data mining...etc, which may at present do not have 
sufficient legal basis within the EU, would risk violating the ECHR. This view was upheld in the 
case Liberty v. United Kingdom
141
.  
 
In relation to the qualitative requirement for ‗legitimacy‘, ECtHR in Heinz Huber v. Germany 
stated that even when the purpose of processing data is legitimate, if the processing is beyond its 
original purpose, this needs to be consented by the data subject or made legal through other 
means
142
. While the DPD provides for legitimacy by prescribing to obtain consent
143
, it may not 
motivate privacy risk assessments to see consent as necessary in subsequent processing of the 
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same data for a different purpose perceived ‗legitimate‘ by the data controller. The opinion of the 
Courts in Heinz Huber v. Germany also aligns with the call made by this thesis in the previous 
chapter for a more granular assessment of the instances requiring consent of the data subjects. 
 
When it comes to ‗necessity‘ requirement, ECtHR has observed that it extends beyond the rights 
of an individual into number of societal aspects such as pluralism, tolerance, broadmindedness, 
liberty, equality,…etc144. However, in the absence of a proper definition for ‗necessity‘ require-
ment by the ECtHR, the Courts have often adopted a proportionality test in determining the ne-
cessity of a given action. For instance, in Luordo v. Italy
145
, the ECtHR asserted that although the 
government interference was legal, the said interference was unnecessary given its disproportio-
nate nature.   
 
Another important aspect of these qualitative parameters is that the priority for the Court is the 
legality of the said action
146
. If an action is deemed illegal, the Court would not proceed to de-
termine whether the said action adheres with the legitimacy, necessity or proportionality re-
quirements. Thus, in terms of privacy risks assessments pertaining to health and wellbeing apps, 
it is imperative that data controllers avoid processing of personal data as much as possible, which 
hasn‘t been afforded clear legal provisions through National, or EU laws.  
 
In terms of harmonizing different interests, this thesis therefore argues that a privacy risk as-
sessment that is sensitive to the provisions of the ECHR in terms of the said qualitative parame-
ters in addition to the requirements of the DPD would better serve as a tool to capture the privacy 
risks faced by the data subjects.   
6.2. Scalability and proportionality instead of stringency 
 
In chapter 5, scalability was enumerated as one important characteristic in privacy risk assess-
ments. Its importance was largely associated with its potential to ease the burden and the cost of 
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conducting a one-size-fits-all type of a PIA by a data controller. This would mean that even a 
small organization would be able to undertake a privacy risk assessment depending on the size of 
the project and the volume and sensitivity of the data being handled.  
 
Proportionality on the other hand was seen by this thesis as beneficial in relation to assessing the 
likelihood of a privacy risk, associated threats and the degree of harm. Being a general principle 
of the EU law
147
, proportionality principle is inherent in a series of infinite applications of the 
law. At the same time, as it is present in most other national laws, it transcends barriers erected 
between them
148
. These characteristics therefore made this thesis to consider proportionality as a 
useful approach in harmonizing the different interests and create a generalizable understanding 
of privacy risk assessment pertaining to health and wellbeing apps. 
 
In this regard, it may be useful to consider the proportionality principle as a rationality test con-
sisting of three components
149. One of which is the ‗suitability test‘, which refers to the appro-
priateness of a chosen measure in achieving a proposed aim. Second is the ‗necessity test‘, which 
aims to assess whether a chosen measure to achieve a proposed goal is the least restrictive in 
terms of a chosen norm. Third is ‗stricto sensu‘, where a measure is considered disproportionate 
even if it is found to be suitable and necessary, if the said measure imposes an excessive burden 
on the individual. Given this understanding, this thesis argues that the same tests could be used in 
guiding the data controllers. For example, if regulators impose burdensome measures for assess-
ing privacy risks on health and wellbeing apps, Courts may view the same as stricto sensu and 
thereby rule against its implementation. Similarly, if a data controller for a health and wellbeing 
app decides to use a method that may not reflect the true nature of the data being processed, the 
Courts may hold such measures as inappropriate within the meaning of the proportionality prin-
ciple. 
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Thus, scalability and proportionality could guide the data controllers in performing a privacy risk 
assessment and cater to their interest of innovation by minimizing the harm to the data subjects 
privacy.   
6.3. Accountability beyond borders 
 
In terms of health and wellbeing apps, the role played by cloud computing cannot be under-
mined. However, conflicts arise as a result of cloud computing being a mode of reducing the 
direct control of data while the regulators in the EU via the DPD is keen on keeping control of 
the same data
150
. Thus, cloud computing does pose a significant legal uncertainty in terms of 
identifying the controller, determining the applicable law, and with regard to transfer of personal 
data outside of the EU.  
 
As discussed in chapter 3, determining the data controller for a health and wellbeing app is not 
an easy task. There are many entities such as the app developers, device manufacturers, app dep-
loyers and even third party data processors, who may play the role of the data controller at dif-
ferent points. In a complex scenario such as this, utilizing cloud computing would add to the di-
lemma as cloud computing itself would give rise to an uncertainty in identifying the data control-
ler. From a privacy risk assessment point of view, this would mean that the responsibility and 
accountability towards carrying out such an assessment might also become unclear.  
 
An inevitable result of using cloud computing is that the data collected through health and well-
being apps may be transferred across borders to different member states or even to locations out-
side of the EU. According to the DPD Article 25, personal data cannot be transferred to countries 
outside of the EU, which do not offer adequate level of protection unless the data subject has 
given his or her consent unambiguously
151
. From the point of view of cloud technology or the 
mobile app industry, data portability is a key factor that drives innovation and developments in 
                                                 
 
150
 Menon, Gowri. Regulatory Issues in Cloud Computing-An Indian Perspective. In:Journal of Engineering Com-
puters & Applied Sciences. Vol.2(2013).pp.18-22. 
151
 DPD, Article 26  
  
50 
 
cloud-based technology
152
. Thus, it may be possible that the data controllers would avoid assess-
ing the risks pertaining to a cloud service, which takes over the processing of personal data.  
 
However, it was enumerated in chapter 3 that a data controller who may become a cloud client 
should conduct a thorough risk assessment in the light of full disclosure from such cloud service 
providers
153
. In the absence of a regulatory obligation for the data controllers however, it is un-
likely that every health and wellbeing app developer or data controller would undertake such an 
assessment or all cloud service providers would provide clear descriptions as to where the actual 
data processing takes place.  
 
Apart from these considerations, health and wellbeing app users may themselves use cloud ser-
vices to store their data away from their own devices. Based on the Article 3 of the DPD, such 
actions would be considered the ‗household exception‘ and therefore any such data may not be 
covered by the DPD. The risk here is that any processing that is undertaken on these data by 
third parties may also not be covered by the DPD
154
. However, if privacy risk assessments are to 
move beyond a mere compliance check with the DPD, data controllers or the app developers 
should assess such risks as the data subjects or the app users may not be in a position to foresee 
the potential harm.  
 
When considering these challenges, it is clear that privacy risks emanating from the cloud may 
not be remediable completely. At the same time, uncertainty has been created by cloud compu-
ting as the existing laws are not necessarily adaptable to the intricacies of cloud computing. 
  
However, this thesis sees an opportunity to minimize this uncertainty by implementing legal ob-
ligations on the part of the data controllers or app developers, on accountability towards the data 
that they collect and process. In fact, the notion of a single accountable entity has been suggested 
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in the event of cloud computing or any other technology that introduces multiple data control-
lers
155
. In this model, privacy of the data subjects escalates through contractual terms between 
different data controllers and the data processors in the cloud. From the point of view of the data 
subjects and the regulators, they have to deal with only one entity, which is the initial data con-
troller for the collected data.  
 
Similar to cloud computing, big data and profiling techniques are also seen as essential elements 
of future innovations around health and wellbeing apps. As discussed in chapter 3, these technol-
ogies have the potential to create new information from seemingly harmless data, which may 
even become new sensitive data. Therefore, this thesis sees big data and profiling as a special 
category within privacy risk assessments around health and wellbeing apps. However, the chal-
lenge as perceived by this thesis is to perform a balanced risk assessment, which not only look 
into the risks, but also into the benefits of profiling.  
 
In fact, ICO has endorsed this view by indicating that big data projects need to be clear and truth-
ful from the onset about the benefits of such projects not only in terms of organizational benefits 
but also in terms of individual and societal benefits
156
. However, unless the data controllers or 
app developers are responsible and accountable, economic benefits of big data and profiling may 
overwhelm the need for a transparent disclosure of true benefits and its beneficiaries. Thus, even 
in terms of big data projects and profiling, there is a case to make data controllers or app devel-
opers accountable through appropriate legal obligations towards performing a truthful privacy 
risk assessment from the onset of such projects.  
 
Based on these discussions, this thesis asserts that in a privacy risk assessment, accountability of 
the data controllers or the app developers or both are fundamental in the pursuit of upholding the 
user and regulatory interests. 
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7. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
This thesis aimed to respond three research questions formed around privacy risk assessment of 
health and wellbeing apps. Therefore, the conclusions and the recommendations will be made in 
relation to the areas referred to by the research questions.  
7.1. Contribution to privacy risks by mobile health and wellbeing apps 
 
As perceived by this thesis, there are several instances where legal uncertainty may manifest in 
relation to health and wellbeing apps with privacy implications. These include the inherent diffi-
culty in determining the personal and sensitive nature of the collected data, difficulty in deter-
mining the data controller and the data processor, and the potential for the industry to overlook 
the privacy rights of the app users. The first two instances are largely the result of cloud compu-
ting, big data and profiling technologies, which creates a legal uncertainty. The third instance 
manifests as a result of the enormity and the lucrativeness of the health and wellbeing apps mar-
ket and due to the app users lack of understanding regarding privacy implications.  
 
One implication of this understanding is that there is an immediate necessity to assign responsi-
bility and make data controllers accountable towards a privacy risk assessment of health and 
wellbeing apps. In this regard, the thesis recognizes app developers to be in a position to better 
foresee and identify the potential privacy risks pertaining to such apps. However, the thesis does 
not see an equivalence between app developers and the ‗producers‘ as perceived by the proposed 
GDPR given that the latter seems merely to perform the role of a data processor. Diluting the 
responsibility and the accountability of an app developer to a mere data processor may not serve 
the purpose of protecting the privacy rights as it again would create uncertainty about who the 
data controller would be. Therefore, this thesis recommends to identify app developers as having 
similar responsibilities and obligations to that of the data controllers through appropriate legisla-
tion.  
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7.2. The state of privacy risk assessment approaches relevant to mobile apps   
 
In answering this question, the thesis compared three privacy risk assessments embedded within 
the RFID, CNIL and ICO PIA approaches. Before the comparison, the thesis adopted the stand 
that risk-based approaches should provide clarity in terms of the obligations of the data control-
ler, provide an objective assessment of the risks, harms and the benefits, and not all privacy risk 
assessments need to have the same degree of rigor.  
 
Based on this understanding, the thesis was able to deduce the following under several relevant 
themes. 
 
Link between data protection principles and privacy risk assessments: Introduction of new 
technologies such as big data and profiling expands the scope of privacy. Therefore, limiting 
privacy risk assessments to the fundamental principles of data protection and information privacy 
may not be adequate.  
 
Consent and privacy risks: The data controllers of health and wellbeing apps may have to con-
sider consent in a more granular manner. This would mean that privacy risk assessment have to 
consider special groups of people such as children as well as the path taken by a particular set of 
data throughout its lifecycle in assessing the risks. Such a mechanism would enable more control 
for the data subjects and give more opportunities to minimize the need of non-anonymized data 
for the data controllers.  
 
The need for accountability: There is a need to implement methodologies not only to recognize 
the data controller and the data processor, but also to recognize those who are responsible to un-
dertake privacy risk assessment to improve responsibility and accountability. Given the compli-
mentary roles played by the app developer and the potential data controller, the thesis recom-
mends considering both as partly responsible towards the privacy risk assessment.  
 
Scalability: The thesis does not agree with the proposed GDPR in its acceptance of pseudoano-
nymization carrying less strict data protection regime. The understanding gathered through this 
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thesis was that scalability of privacy risk assessments while appropriate in most instances; it 
should not in any way scale the data controllers obligations to data protection and privacy laws.  
 
Likelihood of risk, threats and the degree of harm: The thesis recognized reasonable expecta-
tions of the data subjects, proportionality principle and reasonable terms as vital components of 
privacy risk assessments around health and wellbeing apps and therefore would recommend the 
same for future privacy risk assessments.  
 
Implementing privacy risk assessments: There is a necessity to impart legal obligations on 
recording and reporting the outcomes of a privacy risk assessment at least when it comes to apps 
handling sensitive data. However, given the costs and the expertise necessary in reporting, the 
thesis recommends such obligations to be scaled in line with the overall scaling of the privacy 
risk assessment process.  
 
Privacy-by-design and privacy-by-default: These concepts were recognized as a means of mo-
tivating the industry to minimize its liabilities and to ease the burden of having to flood the con-
sumers with privacy notices and requests for consent at regular intervals. However, in order to 
achieve privacy-by-design or privacy-by-default, it is vital that data controllers oblige with the 
need to perform a privacy risk assessment as the first step. 
 
7.3. Harmonizing the EU laws, industry interests and actual privacy expectations of the 
users of health and wellbeing apps   
 
In responding to the third research question, the thesis recognized three focus areas under which 
it was able to make several recommendations. 
 
Privacy beyond compliance: This thesis reiterates the need for privacy risk assessments to be 
more than a mere compliance check with the DPD. In doing so, adherence with the ECHR and 
the insights afforded through ECtHR cases were emphasized. The thesis also highlighted the 
States obligations under the ECHR to implementing legal guidance towards conducting an ap-
  
55 
 
propriate privacy risk assessment by the data controllers. Therefore, it is recommended that such 
guidance ought to be more sensitive towards the qualitative requirements such as legality, legiti-
macy and proportionality while maintain the compliance requirements with the DPD.  
 
Scalability and proportionality instead of stringency: This thesis enumerated the importance 
of privacy risk assessments to be scalable in order to motivate the data controllers and to promote 
innovation. In this regard, the thesis recommends adopting proportionality principle in harmoniz-
ing the different interests within the privacy risk assessment and facilitate innovation with mini-
mum harm to data subjects privacy.    
 
Accountability beyond borders: While acknowledging the legal dilemma posed by cloud com-
puting, this thesis recognizes the importance of data portability in terms of innovation and cost 
effectiveness. Similarly, the benefits afforded to the individual and to the society through big 
data and profiling technologies were also acknowledged. However, unregulated use of any of 
these technologies may harm the privacy of health and wellbeing app users and therefore this 
thesis recommends the adaptation of ‗single accountable entity‘. Such an entity would better 
serve in promoting the undertaking of privacy risk assessments and for such assessments to be 
transparent. 
7.4. Final remark 
 
Health and wellbeing apps are set to become an everyday part of life and would require its users 
to provide more and more data to perform its tasks. While the benefits often outweigh the priva-
cy risks imposed by such apps, there is an immediate requirement to ease the legal uncertainty 
that could facilitate exploitation of personal and sensitive data in mass scale. A scalable and a 
transparent privacy risk assessment obligation is seen by this thesis as a way to remedy this situa-
tion. However, in order to implement the same, the EU laws (the proposed GDPR) ought to pro-
vide guidance on methodologies to identify the relevant data controller among many entities and 
the obligatory party to the privacy risk assessment. The national regulators on the other hand 
ought to implement desirable standards fitting to its context for privacy risk assessments that take 
into account the reasonable expectations of the app users, principles of proportionality, reasona-
ble terms and qualitative parameters of privacy rights.  
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